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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

HENRY EARLEY,
Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

7725

KARL L. JACKSON,
Appella.nt.

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
PETITION F'OR REHEARING

STATEMENT
Plaintiff and Respondent has filed a Petition for
Rehearing and in support thereof has submitted a Brief
in which is set forth three points claimed to be error of
the Supreme Court in its decision heretofore rendered
justifying a rehearing. While Appellant does not believe
that either of the points raised are supported by the
record and the law applicable in this case, he further
contends that the matters raised by Respondent have
nothing to do with the Court's decision and therefore
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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this Brief is submitted as an answer to the claims made
so that the Court will be fully advised in the matter
when considering the Petition for Rehearing filed herein.
Appellant in answer to the arguments of Respondent
submits the following points as being determinative:
POINTS
1. The Court did not base its decision on the fact
that the driver of Appellant's truck was confronted with
an emergency.
2. The question of the negligence of the driver of
Appellant's truck was not involved in the Court's decision.
3. · The Court did not misconstrue either the facts
or the law in concluding that Respondent was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT DID NOT BASE ITS DECISION ON
THE FACT THAT THE DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S TRUCK
WAS CONFRONTED WITH AN EMERGENCY.

The sole question 'Yhich Appellant raised in his
appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Plaintiff
as a matter of law was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident. In making this argument it was
necessarily conceded that Appellant's negligence is not
an issue in the case. However, the argument contained
Petition for Rehearing brief in support thereof, as well
as the origip.al Brief filed herein, repeatedly attempts to
throw the emphasis of the case. upon the issue of whether
Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident. We again wish to point out
2
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to the Court that that que~tion i~ not involved except
to detern1ine \vhether such negligence \vas the sole cause
of the accident. Nor did the Court in its decision atte1npt
to exonerate the Defendant frorn any claimed negligence.
The question \Yas, and is, \Yhether the Plaintiff, Henry
Earley, \vas guilty of contributory negligence. The Court
points this out in the first paragraph of its opinion
wherein it is stated:
~'Appellant contends that its motion for a
Judgment not,vithstanding the verdict should have
been granted because the evidence shows as a
matter of law that Respondent was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately caused
the accident."
~

In outlining the issue to be resolved by the Supreme
Court the opinion further states that Respondent apparently concedes that he was negligent in parking the truck
in the place and in the manner in which it was parked and
in running down the north side of the highway, but "contends that it was a jury question as to whether this contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident or whether Appellant's negligence was the sole
proximate cause." In resolving this issue in favor of
Appellant, the Court finally concludes:
"His (Respondent's) negligence which continued up to the very impact was the direct cause
of the accident, and nothing intervened between
it and his injury to Blake it only a rernote cause
thereof."
Whether or not there was a conflict in the testirnony
as to the driver's ability to see Respondent's truck until
3
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he was fron1 within 250 feet to 300 feet away or whether
the driver of Appellant's vehicle saw Respondent's truck
at all is not material insofar as the question of Respondent's negligence is concerned. Regardless of whethe.r the
driver of Appellant's truck saw or did not see Respondent's vehicle on the highway it is without dispute that
Respondent parked the truck on the highway with the
headlights facing toward the northwest across the highway and not along the road in the direction from which
the oncoming truck driven by Appellant's driver was
proceeding. F'urther, Respondent was aware that the
Appellant's vehicle was approaching when it was at least
a half mile away. The question thus resolves itself to
one of whether the Respondent acted reasonable under
all of the circumstances, considering all that transpired
from the moment he stopped his truck on the highway
and proceeded to park the same at right angles covering
the entire lane for east bound traffic until he saw the
approaching vehicle and ran toward it instead of getting
out of the way.
Whether or not there was a question of fact with
respect to the time when the driver of Appellant's truck
saw or should have seen the Respondent's vehicle, such
would have no bearing on the Court's decision for the
reason that insofar as this case is concerned the negligence of Appellant's driver is apparently recognized and
therefore any dispute on the evidence with respect to
his negligence would not make any difference in the result
obtained. The question is not whether the driver of
Appellant's vehicle was confronted with an emergency
4
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so as to relieve ·..:-\ppellant from liability but whether
Respondent 'vas a'vare of a situation which he had by
his o"\vn nets created so that his subsequent conduct was
negligence on his part 'v hich would bar his recovery.
The Court did not excuse Appellant's driver frorn
his conduct but did, by its decision, place some of the
responsibility upon the Respondent where under all the
circumstances it properly lay. Insofar as Respondent's
conduct is concerned he was not justified in assuming
that Appellant's driver, proceeding along the highway
on the right hand portion thereof would see Respondent's
truck parked across that portion of the hard surface
of the highway reserved for east bound traffic and bring
his vehicle to a stop without turning the same from its
course of travel to the north portion of the highway in
order to go around such parked vehicle. Inasmuch as
Respondent attempted to proceed down the north half
of the roadway, well knowing that Appellant would have
to use that portion of the highway in order to avoid
striking Respondent's vehicle, we submit that Respondent was negligent as a matter of law contributing to his
own injury. We do not contend, as does Respondent,
that the negligence of one party was the sole proximate
cause of the accident, but we do contend that the negligence of the Respondent was a contributing cause of the
accident.
2. THE QUESTION OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S TRUCK WAS NOT INVOLVED
IN THE COURT'S DECISION.

What has been said under the preceding point like-
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wise is applicable to the argument presented in response
to the position taken in Respondent's brief under point
2. The comment by the Court in its opinion to the effect
that the driver of Appellant's car was not able to determine "until he was within 250 or 300 feet of the parked
truck that it was obstructing the entire lane of his side
of the traffic" is con sis tent with the law and the facts
in the case. Even though we assume that under the statute Appellant's driver was required to see the parked
vehicle at a distance of 350 feet, it is nevertheless apparent that such driver under the circumstances here presented would not instantaneously be able to recognize
the danger, but it would take at least a moment, during
which the vehicle would continue to travel, in order to
react to the situation and proceed to turn to the north
to pass the vehicle on the other portion of the highway.
As stated by the Court in its opinion, "Respondent, by
blocking the lane to eastbound traffic made it mandatory
for any such traffic which wished to pass by to go into
the north lane."
The issue which the Court resolved was not whether
Appellant's driver was or was not negligent in failing
to see the position of Respondent's car until he was from
300 feet to 250 feet away (or even less), but whether
Respondent himself was negligent when, realizing that
an approaching car would have to proceed on to the
north portion of the highway to pass, nevertheless proceeded to run along such north portion toward the
approaching car, at no time stopping or turning out to
avoid a collision with such vehicle. The fact, if it be a
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fact, that the driYt>l' of .L\ppellanfs truck should have
been able to stop before reaehing the parked vehicle
1nerely begs the question insofar as relieving Respondent
of responsibility for his conduct.
3. THE COURT DID NOT MISCONSTRUE EITHER
THE FACTS OR THE LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

In connection \Yith this point, Respondent apparently seeks to argue that had Appellant's truck continued
on its course on the south portion of the roadway there
would have been no i1npact between it and the Respondent. The physical evidence showed that there was no
abrupt S\Yerving of the Appellant's automobile but that
the brake marks continued in a diagonal line from the
south toward the north crossing on to the north portion
of the roadway. At no time did those marks reach the
north edge of the roadway until at a point approximately
where the parked truck was located. Thus it would appear as a matter of law that Respondent was not traveling down the north edge of the roadway but was running
down the north half of the roadway somewhere between
the middle and the north edge. While the Supreme Court
did not hold that Respondent deliberately ran into the
course of the oncoming vehicle it nevertheless did state
that "he was fully aware of the danger which he had
created of a collision with his truck and yet he placed
himself in the very path where the approaching truck
would have to travel to avoid such collision and ran
towards the truck thereby giving the driver little time
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to avoid hitting him after his lights would reveal his
presence, when he could have avoided all danger to himself by running on one of the shoulders of the highway
where he knew passing vehicles would be unlikely to
travel."
The foregoing statement of the Court succinctly
states the position heretofore advanced by Appellant in
his appeal to the effect that the conduct of the Respondent contributed to the accident and resulting injury. In
holding that the Respondent placed himself in a position
where he knew Appellant's truck would have to go if
it were to pass the truck par~ed on the highway, the
Court thereby determined that as a reasonable man the
Plaintiff was required to expect that the driver of the
approaching vehicle, upon observing the parked truck
on the highway, would turn out to pass.
This conclusion is certainly supported by the testimony of the respondent himself, as reflected on page 145
of the Record. At the risk of being repetitious, we quote
the testimony as follows:

"Q. Now, Mr. Earley, you knew that this car, in
order to get around your car, would have to
get over on the north half of the highway,
didn't you~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. You knew that and appreciated it at the
time, didn't you~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And yet knowing all of that in your attempts
to extricate yourself from this predicament
8
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you had put yourself in, you \vent down the
north half of that highway'? Isn't that right?

. A...

Yes, sir.

Q. Right in the face of that onco1ning autornobile,
isn't that correct~
A.

Yes, sir."

With respect to the position that respondent occupied
on the high,vay, he also testified on cross examination
(R. p. 150) :
"Q. Now you did go down there waving your
arms, isn't that correct~
A. Yes, sir.

Q.

And it is your present niemory that you were
on the oiled portion of the highway at all
times, isn't that so~

.lt.

I would say so, yes, sir.

Q. And your present idea about it is that you
were in that half of the highway somewhere
which was north of the middle lane~
A.

Yes, sir."

Respondent further contends that even assuming
Appellant's truck would have to turn to the left to avoid
a collision, nevertheless, "there was certainly no reason
to expect that it would suddenly swerve .from the south
side of the highway clear over to the north edge of the
paved road to avoid a vehicle which was 140 feet distant."
We submit that there is no evidence in the record to the
effect that Appellant's truck did swerve suddenly from
the south side of the highway to the north side. Respond-
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ent claims that the brake marks "zig-zagged back and
forth across the highway," citing page 186 of the Record.
What the witness Johnson actually testified to was that
the tracks of the car appeared as testified to by the "former witness." The former witness was the highway
patrolman Reese who stated that the brake marks started
at a point approximately 100 feet west of the culvert and
"then they gradually went up this way until right approximately at this point they went off the road." (R. p. 165)
It is a common fault of individuals to attempt to
relieve themselves of responsibility by attempting to shift
the entire burden upon the other party. This, apparently, has been the strategy in the instant case because
Respondent repeatedly has avoided answering for his
own misconduct by attempting to shift the responsibility
on to the Appellant. We can only state in this respect
that for every claimed act of negligence on the part of
the Appellant there is conversely a like failure on the
part of the Respondent to act reasonably under all of the
circumstances.
Respondent has not challenged the Court's statement
to the effect that it is conceded that respondent was negligent so that the only question for determination on appeal is whether such negligence, as a matter of law,
proximately contributed to the injury received by him.
This being so, the cases cited by Appellant heretofore
clearly support the position taken by the court in reaching its decision.
As pointed out in the court's opinion the original
stage was set by the negligence of Respondent in park-

1.0
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ing the trurk upon the high\vay in a position across the
traffic lane for east bound traffic; in turning off the motor
so that the truck could not be 1noved immediately in the
event of approaching vehicles; in leaving the truck in
this position while he attempted to remove the offal from
the back of the truck; and then when Appellant's truck
did approach by further injecting hilnself into the act
in getting off the truck and running towards the approaching vehicle waving his arms. This clearly demonstrates Respondent's state of mind-that he had been
guilty of gross carelessness in doing what had been done
-so that he now attempted to correct the situation by
further involving himself. He ran directly toward the
approaching vehicle in the direction from which it was
approaching and never attempted to turn out before
being struck by it.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion we call the Court's attention to /the
fact that even though Respondent was injured, such fact
does not entitle him to recover in this case. Respondent's
attempt to influence the court by his concluding statement
that if the decision of the Supreme Court is allowed to
stand "respondent will have nothing for his pain, suffering and injuries," sounds more like an impassioned plea
to the jury and may have been the cause of obtaining a
verdict in the trial of the case. Certainly this Court is
above being affected by such remarks. If he was engaged
in the course of his employment at the time of the injury,
Respondent may have a claim under theW orlanen's Com11
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pensation Act which does not require "fault" as a basis
of recovery, nor does it permit "contributory negligence"
to affect the employee's right to compensation. But in
attempting to collect damages from Appellant, the law
is clear that the parties will be left where they are if the
negligence of both contributed to cause the injuries and
damage.
We respectfully submit that the evidence adduced at
the trial shows as a matter of law that Respondent
contributed to cause his own injury and that the decision
heretofore rendered by this Court to that effect should
not be disturbed. The Petition for Rehearing should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT J. JENS.EN
R.A.BURNS
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Appellant
'·
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